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A SOCIAL SCIENTIST AMONG TECBNICIANS
by Ian Hamnett*
More and more people recognise that the social scientist has
an important role to play in technological change; fewer (outside
the academic world) have any very clear idea of what this role should
be, I have just completed a period of about two and a half years
as a part-time consultant sociologist to a large and expensive U.N.
study mission charged with drawing up a comprehensive plan for the
development of the soil and water resources of a small country in
southern Africa, My experience over this tine has prompted some
thoughts on the relationship between the sociologist and other
team members in a project of this kind, where nearly all the f ield-
workers and consultants are in the nature of things engineers,
agronomists and accountants, and where the social scientist1s
presence can almost be regarded as a luxury or even prestige item
which only a "progressive" or "sophisticated" f irm of engineering
consultants would think it desirable to employ. Neither his
employers nor his technical colleagues see the sociologist's role
as he sees it himself; moreover, the discrepancies between their
perceptions conceal some remarkable and even dangerous absences
in the planning and developmental process.
Initially, I found that I was expected to discharge three
principal tasks in the feasibility study. First, I was asked to
assess the will and ability of subsistence cultivators to accept
and profit from development, in particular from intensive irrigated
agriculture. The implied assumption was not only that there
existed an esoteric technique for the objective assessment and
evaluation of "attitudes" to intensive agriculture among people
who had no experience of it, but further that such "attitudes" were
somehow ultimate givens, explicable in the last resort (if indeed
explicable at all, which was doubted) in terms either (pessimisti-
cally) of "conservatism", "superstition", "laziness", etc., or
(optimistically) of the opposites of these traits. My own
methodology diverged sharply. Ny working assumption was (and is)
that attitudes are best treated as effects not causes, and that
on the whole men should be taken to act "rationally" in their
situation. Like Samuel Butler, have ever been of the opinion
that the greater part of mankind do approximatelr laiow where they
get that which does them good" (Erewhon chap. 15), If icy acept-
ism about attitudes as explanations clearly surprised my engineering
colleagues, my "rationalist" bias was either regarded as starry-
eyed liberalism of an amusing but hardly serious kind or else
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explained away by the argument that even if the subsistence culti-
vators were acting rationally according to their lights, those
lights were very din0
Thus, the second part of my brief was to advise on how the
rural population could be induced (if at all) to emerge f ron their
primitive darksess and non-understanding and to open their eyes to
the advantages which developnent would bring. Here again, there
was the implication that attitudes were fundamental and that the
important question was how they could be manipulated. Now
obviously I would not have been engaged in this work at all if I
did not believe that the people would indeed gain fron an appro-
priate development; but I did not share the engineers' belief that
native suspicion of change was siinjly and unequivocally due to
their ignorance any more than it was due to their supposed "irration-
ality"0 In the particular case involved, indeed, the lessons of
the previous century had shown how easily land "development" could
lead to the loss of national land as a communal resource. Few
feel secure efiough to trust themselves to a European venture which
looks not unlike similar ventures in the past. (Then, the result
had been the expropriation of the indigenous owners and their
reduction to the status of casual labourers, the consequence of a
long series of "concessions", for which the African Kings were
themselves partly responsible.) The upshot, in any event, is
that nearly half the land resources of the nation are held on so-
called title-deed tenure, nearly all of this being in European
hands0
But, more generally, I am not convinced that even where such
risks can be excluded, the people are either irrational or ignorant
in reading their situation as they do. Subsistence cultivation
not only appears to be but often is "zero-sum"; one manta gain
tends to be another's loss, where even a small economic advantage
can create a debtor relationship and where agricultural success
can result in the withdrawal of an intensively cultivated holding
from the national (tribal) patrimony. Where people are very poor
they are not foolish or ignorant in their refusal to take risks -
they are eminently sensible and wise. It is better to be reasonably
sure of a bare sufficiency than to chance a loss this year in the
hope of plenty the year after. Some of my colleagues failed to
appreciate the narrowness of the margin that lay between subsistence
and real destitution among the people for whom we were supposed to
be working0 The economic conservatism of the subsistence culti-
vators appeared to them precisely as a set of irrational attitudes
rather than as a functional response to a real-life situation of
scarcity. Thus, they found the social-structural pressures acting
against "possessive individualism" (in Macphersonts sense) unin-
telligible and unworthy of serious attention.1
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Thirdly, having excluded some forms of development as un-
workable in the light of native "attitudes", I was expected to
make recommendations as to how the remaining engineering proposals
could best be given effect to in sociological terms. The socio-
logist was in a way thus seen as social technician, whose function
was subsidiary to arid derivative from that of the engineers and
accountants: the latter specified all the goals and some of the
means, the former only a few of the means and none of the goals.
I could tell them what could not (or probably could mot) be done,
and I could indicate the best (i.e. least troublesome) way of
doing what could be done; but I could mot really originate
proposals or recommendations that were thought to rest on what
were called "sociological factors" alone. Although this may seem
the most innocuous of the three engineering conceptions of the
sociologist's role, I think that in fact it is the most alarming
of them, and it is one that raises some interesting and fundamental
ciuestions. "Sociological factors" or "social factors" (no distinc-
tion was drawn) were thought of as residual items, as a remainder
left over when hydrological, agronomic, constructional and accounting
problems had been solved or at least taken account of. Although
this is not the place to develop an argument against such a mis-
understanding, the consequences of this view deserve some
elaboration.
The most serious of these consequences was that certain
crucial areas of decision making were made to shrink almost to
vanishing point. It became quite literally impossible, within
the framework of these assumptions, to make certain kinds of
decision at all, or even to see that there were decisions to be
made, since they were defined away from the reach of any of the
collaborative disciplines and consigned to the "catch-all" category
of "policy": a realm from which all trespassers were to be
excluded. Decisions that were made on engineering or accounting
grounds were not regarded as involving "policy": they counted as
"objective" recommendations, which it was up to the Cabinet to
override if for any reason they disliked them. As a sociologist
I could intervene only by producing reasons against a particular
form of development on the grounds that it would not "work" in the
light of Imown prejudices or preferences among the people. But
I was not really expected to argue that there were sociological
grounds of any other kind for adopting (say) smallholdings and
rejecting (say) commercial estates as the dominant form of devel-
opment. At least initially it was supposed that estate
development resting on wage-labour, rather than on homestead
small-holdings operated so far as possible in accordance with
customary tenurial norms, would yield a larger and prompter f insu-
cial return; certainly it would be more open to direct "rational"
management.
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It was of ten hard to find a point of entry foe some of the
questions I wanted to ask. Who, in fact, would gain? Would the
fruits of development really be more widely spread when the general
quality of rural life in local terms of reference was not so much
enhanced as degraded, even though the GNP might be marginally
increased and a larger quantity of vegetables and other fresh
foodstuffs exported to (say) Durban and Pietermaritzburg? The
problem was that if the engineers and accountants wanted commercial
estates, then to contradict their "objective" view was to raise
evaluative and "political" questions which lay outside the field of
the study mission. It was, therefore, assumed that to give over-
riding priority to engineering and (in a limited sense) economic
factors was "non-political", and that "politics" or "policy
decisions" entered into the matter only where these factors were to
any degree displaced. At the back. of this was the belief that
while ministers and civil servants (of course) needed instruction
on technical matters, they needed none on "sociological" ones,
since they were taken to know their own society better than any
outsider could. This not only of course contradicts the socio-
logist's view of his role, but also overlooks the fact that local
decision-makers themselves tend to constitute a partial group
within the indigenous society, and that their interests and pers-
pectives are neither privileged nor irreformable. Por the
sociologist, the Cabinet's view of the society is only one piece
of evidence among many, and while invaluable as data has no special
claim to respect at the level of analysis.
I believe that at times I was more aware of the impact that
certain changes aught have on the local society than some members
of that society guessed at. A minister would profess in all
sincerity to set a high value on the egalitarian and "solidary"
characteristics of traditional social organisation, but fail to see,
for instance, that the introduction of comnierical and individual
tenure into native land-holdings would threaten these values.
As has been said, "there is no surer way of depriving a peasant of
his land than to give him a registered title"01 The probable
effects in this case are no doubt obvious to many, but I found that
I could not take it for granted that local politicians always
appreciated points of this kind. Though certainly I did not regard
it as my function to tell African authorities what they "ought to
want", I nevertheless saw it as part of my role to indicate that
R. Simpson, 'New Land Law in Malawi', Journal of Administration
Overseas, Vol. 6 no. 4, October 1967. See also C.P.A. Sawyerr,
'Discriminatory restrictions on private dispositions of land in
Tanganyika: a second look', Journal of African Law, Vol. 13 no. 1,
Spring 1969.
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what they wanted might be contradicted rather than achieved by
certain kinds of lower-level policy. In other words, I felt able
to point to some of the "unintended consequences of deliberate
acts". In this way, "policy" too fell within my role as I saw it;
but my colleagues, on the whole, did not see it this way. For
them, my arguments too often seemed "evaluative" rather than
"scientific" - itself a frame of reference which to ice rather
seemed to over-simplify matters.
Development plamning thus tended to be polarised into two
contrasting forms - on the one hand, the strictly technical, which
lay within the purview of engineers and accountants, and on the
other, the "policy making" which was referred to Cabinet and
treated as simply a constraint. This had the effect of obscuring
the fact that at every turn policy decisions were being covertly
and invisibly made, smuggled in without proper consideration or even
awareness within the interstices of cost-benefit analysis and loan
repayment schedules. For example, a high initial re-payment would
saddle incoming settlers with a heavy burden just when they were
least able to bear it. A rising rate would undermine the looked
for continuous improvement in living standards as time passed.
But to fund the debt in the govermment's hands meant making a
"political" recommendation, since it would in effect require the
advanced sector of the economy to carry the financial operation over
the hump through its contributions to general revenue; this there-
fore meant looking at the proposed development in the context of the
total economic and social structure of the country, a commitment
which was arguably outside the remit of the research project.
It also involved (ultimately) a consideration of the workings of an
economy so intimately linked with South Africa that no independent
appraisal of its balance of payments position is possible, since
there are no financial controls on the export of money or capital.
There was then, a very real danger that the resultant recom-
mendations would emerge as being highly "political", but that this
character would be disguised by the fact that the "politics"
involved were of a highly economis tic kind. They would also simply
reinforce the existing polarities of rich and poor and do little
more than bring a few black faces into the category of the (rela-
tively) rich. In the event, this did not happen, or t least not
to the degree that at one point I feared. This was perhaps partly
due to muy own resistance to the pressures built into the structure
of the research, but also to the passivity and lack of interest
shown by the government, which had the unlocked-for effect of
compelling a greater explicit attention to matters of "policy" on
the part of the team. But though it seemed clear to me from the
start that decisions which would tend to perpetuate and even
aggravate existing inequalities were fully as "political" as
decisions that worked against them, this was not a view of the
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matter that I found it easy to make intelligible to the others
involved. It was, incidentally, interesting to find that where
matters of "technical rationality" were involved, the engineering
experts would happily make recommendations of a fairly radical kind
without any discomfort: for instance, to nationalise all water
rights.
I do not wish to suggest that the blame for the kind of
situation that I have partially described lies simply with the
engineers. There is no particular reason why an engineer should
imow what a sociologist either purports or hopes to do until the
sociologist tells him; the latter, therefore, has to explain his
role as he sees it to members of other disciplines and avocations.
There has been a large literature on the sociology of development,
but (so far as I Imow) very little on the sociology of development
, and the problems that arise in interdisciplinary collaboration.
It is too easily assumed that we all talk the same language because
we all speak English (or French, or Russian, or whatever). What
is still needed is a study of the sociology of technical develop-
ment from the point of view of what goes on inside study missions
and research teams. This would help, perhaps, to create a
greater awareness of the distortions that can be introduced into
"expert" recommendations by the internal structure of the teams and
the misunderstandings that result from peoplets ignorance of each
other's skills and methods.
